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Entrapment is a well-established defense to a criminal
charge, but it is also a "relatively limited defense." United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973). The common
law did not recognize an entrapment defense, adopting the
view that courts should "not look to see who held out the
bait, but [rather] who took it." People v. Mills, 70 N.E.2d 786,
789 (N.Y. 1904). Nevertheless, the defense took root in
several state courts in the late 19th Century. Subsequently,
"[b]eginning with the decision in Sorrells v. United States in
1932, the development of the law of entrapment became
largely an activity of the federal courts, with the states then
adopting the doctrine thereby created." 1 LaFave & Scott,
, .~_Substantive Criminal Law§ 502.2(a), at 597 (1986).
j(d!J? A Biblical analogy is sometimes used to describe entrapf
ment. "And the Lord God said unto woman, what is this
~ thou hast done? And the woman said, The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat." Genesis 3:13. In Sherman v. .
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958). the U.S. Supreme
Court may have been alluding to this reference when it
commented: "Thus the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted."
See also Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without
Scienter) Did Eat - Denial of Crime and the Entrapment
Defense, 1973 U. Ill. L.F. 254.

TYPES OF CASES
The entrapment defense has been raised in some notorious trials, such as Abscam and the DeLorean case. See
Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of
Entrapment, 91 Yale L.J. 1565 (1982) (Abscam involved an
FBI sting operation in which a number of Congressmen
were convicted); Reaves, Squashing Bugs, 70 A.B.A.J. 30
(Oct. 1984) ("John DeLorean was acquitted of drug trafficking despite apparently incriminating videotapes.");
Chambers et al., In the Name of the Father, Time, Jan. 23,
1995, at 38 (discussing an alleged attempted assassination
of Louis Farrakhan by Malcolm X's daughter and whether
she was entrapped by an FBI informant). The defense is

most often raised in drug-related offenses:
The defense of entrapment has been asserted in the
context of a wide variety of criminal activity, including
prostitution, alcohol offenses, counterfeiting, price controlling, and, probably most spectacularly, bribery of
public officials. However, the great majority of the
cases in which an entrapment defense is interposed
involve a charge of some drug offense. 1 LaFave &
Scott, § 502.2, at 598 (1986).

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The use of decoys, deceptions, "sting" operations, informants, undercover agents, and other forms of police stratagems are often necessary and legally permissible. The
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that "the infiltration of drug rings and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices" is one of the "only practicable
me.ans of detection." Russell, 411 U.S. at 432. See also
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 ("Criminal activity is such that
stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal
of the police officer."); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 441 (1932) ("Artifice and stratagem may be employed
to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.").
"Of course evidence that Government agents merely afforded an opportunity or facilities for the commission of the
crime would be insufficient to warrant such an [entrapment]
instruction." Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66
(1988).
[A]n agent deployed to stop the traffic in illegal drugs
may offer the opportunity to buy or sell drugs . . . . In
such a typical case, or in a more elaborate "sting" operation involving government-sponsored fencing
where the defendant is simply provided with the opportunity to commit a crime, the entrapment defense is of
little use because the ready commission of the criminal act amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 54950 (1992).
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In short, the police may employ a variety of stratagems that
rely on deception to catch,criminals;but they maynotin=-duce law-abiding citizens to commit crimes and then prosecute them. Entrapment, therefore, requires the drawing of a
line "between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap
for the unwary criminaL" Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. The
Model Penal Code commentary puts it this way:
Particularly in-the-e[lforcement of laws against vice,
such as !iquOf and ~arcotic laws, it is all but impossible to obtain' evidenc'e for prosecution save by the use
of d8C()Y,~~- -ft1.~£e7~e rarely complaining witnesses;
the partJ~ipan,t~, i i -he crime are satisfying their desir!ils~ ')flt'1.e1ai[li!"is, for example, to obtain evidence
ag~insti=trseller of n rcotics, it will typically be necess"!-{X}J~JfS~,-i,-,;.,•'J·t'""t pf law enforcement to ma~e !he
pllrCI'f~rs-E:n:rntl;~of cbtfrse, to conceal that assoc1at1on
from the seller. Cooperation with the criminal and
something less than absolute truth is required in many
other kinds of cases where the police have an "inside
man" in a group of would-be lawbreakers. The law
must therefore attempt to distinguish between those
deceits and persuasions that are permissible and
those that are not.
Model Penal Code and
Commentaries: Official Draft and Revised Comments
pt. 1, §2.13, at408 (1985).

punish them." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. See also
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 ("Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting_ innocent persons into violations.").
In effect, the Court read an implied exception into the
federal penal code. Accordingly, state courts are not bound
by this aspect of federal substantive criminal law. As the
Ohio Supreme Court noted: "Since defining the entrapment
defense under either of the [two] standards does not implicate federal constitutional principles, we are not bound by
Sorrells and its progeny and are free to adopt either standard." State v. Doran, 5 Ohio St3d 187, 190-91,449 N.E.2d
1295 (1983).
TWO-PRONGED TEST The subjective approach "has two related elements: [1]
government inducement of the crime, and [2] a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the
criminal conduct." Matthews, 485 U.S. at 63. If the accused was induced and was not predisposed, entrapment is
established. There is a tendency, however, to collapse the
two prongs into a single prong dealing only with predisposition. "[l]nducement is significant chiefly as evidence bearing
on predisposition: the greater the inducement, the weaker
the inference that in yielding to it the defendant demonstrated that he was predisposed to commit the crime in question." United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F. 3d 1196, 1200
(7th Cir. 1994) (en bane).

SUBJECTIVE TEST
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932), is
generally regarded as the genesis of the modern entrapment defense. The Sorrells Court stated that "[e]ntrapment
is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer,
and his procurement of its commission by one who would
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or
fraud of the officer." In another passage, the Court wrote
that entrapment occurs
when the criminal design originates with the officials of
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they
may prosecute. ld. at 442.
The Sorrells approach has come to be known as the subjective approach or "origin of intenf' test. The focus is on
the subjective state of mind of the accused - the defendant's predisposition or propensity to commit the offense.
See Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 ("[T]he principal element in the
defense of entrapment [is] the defendant's predisposition to
commit the crime."). In contrast, the minority rule, known as
the objective approach, focuses on the conduct of the police, rather than the defendant's state of mind.
The subjective approach has been consistently affirmed
by the U.S. Supreme Court and is the rule in the majority of
states, including Ohio. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2, at 599
("This subjective approach to entrapment--- is adhered to
by the federal courts as well as a majority of the state
courts.").

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Sherman v. United States
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sorrells subjective
test in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). A
government informant met Sherman at a doctor's office
where they both were participants in a narcotics treatment
program. The informer made numerous requests, citing his
personal suffering, before Sherman acquiesced and obtained drugs. Concurring, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
"Particularly reprehensible in the present case was the use
of repeated requests to overcome petitioner's hesitancy,
coupled with appeals to sympathy based on mutual experiences with narcotics addiction." ld. at 384.
Moreover, Sherman did not profit from these sales, and
no narcotics were found in his apartment when it was
searched. According to the Court, these facts illustrate the
"evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal
sale but also into returning to the habit of use." ld. at 369.
The Court ruled that the police conduct constituted entrapment as a matter of law. Justice Frankfurter advocated the
replacement of the subjective approach with an objective
test.
United States v. Russell
In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), an undercover agent supplied propanone, a necessary ingredient
in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine ("speed").
Although possession of propanone was not illegal, it was
very difficult to obtain. Rejecting Russell's entrapment argument, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the subjective approach:
Sorrells is a precedent of long standing that has already been once reexamined in Sherman and implicit-

UNDERLYING RATIONALE
The Sorrells Court grounded the entrapment defense on
congressional intent: "We are unable to conclude that it
was the intention of the Congress in enacting this statute
[the National Prohibition Act] that its processes of detection
and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by
government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to
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changed the defense by requiring the prosecution to prove
not only that an accused was predisposed to commit the
crime before the opportunity to commit the crime arose, but
also before the Government came on the scene: "[f) his
holding changes entrapment doctrine. Generally, the inquiry is whether a suspect is predisposed before the government induces the commission of the crime, not before
the Government makes initial contact with him." ld. at 55657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that the
majority position "redefines 'predisposition,' and introduces
a new requirement that Government sting operations have
a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before contacting a
suspect." ld. at 556. The majority disagreed, asserting that
its.interpretation was not new:
The dissent is mistaken in claiming that this is an innovation in entrapment law and in suggesting that the
Government's conduct prior to the moment of solicitation is irrelevant. ... Indeed, the proposition that the
accused must be predisposed prior to contact with law
enforcement officers is so firmly established that the
Government conceded the point at oral argument ....
ld. at 549 n. 2.
After Jacobson, the Seventh Circuit, en bane, declared
that "[c]ases both in this and in other circuits, ... recognize
that Jacobson has changed the landscape of the entrapment defense." United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d
1196, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994). The court went on to state:
Predisposition is not a purely mental state, the state of
being willing to swallow the government's bait. It has
positional as well as dispositional force. . ... The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous
training or experience or occupation or acquaintances
that it is likely that if the government had not induced
him to commit the crime some criminal would have
done so; only then does a sting or other arranged
crime take a dangerous person out of circulation. ld.
at 1200.

ly there reaffirmed. Since the defense is not of a constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to
the question and adopt any substantive definition of
the defense that it may find desirable. ld. at 433.
1 A:!n dissent, Justice Stewart commented that the "objective
.f Dapproach to entrapment ... is the only one truly consistent
with the underlying rationale of the defense." ld. at 441.

Hampton v. United States
In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), the
government's involvement in the criminal enterprise was
more pervasive than it had been in Russell. The police informant supplied Hampton with heroin, which was not only
illegal but also constituted the corpus delicti of the sale for
which Hampton was convicted. The plurality opinion once
again reaffirmed the subjective test and then went on to reject a due process entrapment defense. Hampton.conceded that he did not qualify for entrapment under the subjective approach and therefore focused instead on the due
process argument. Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued for
the objective approach and criticized the plurality for not extending the entrapment defense to the Hampton facts:
Where the Government's agent deliberately sets up
the accused by supplying him with contraband and
then bringing him to another agent as a potential purchaser, the Government's role has passed the point of
toleration .... The Government is doing nothing less
than buying contraband from itself through an intermediary and jailing the intermediary. ld. at 498.
Jacobson v. United States
In the Supreme Court's most recent decision, Jacobson
"." v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), the defendant assert(~.ad the entrapment defense to a charge of receiving child
pornography through the mail. The Court agreed with
Jacobson, once again applying the subjective approach:
In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in
an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a
criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime
so that the Government may prosecute. ... Where the
Government has induced an individual to break the
law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, as it
was in this case, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached
by Government agents. ld. at 548-49.
In 1984 Jacobson had ordered two pornographic magazines from a California bookstore, at a time when receipt of
these magazines was legal. Postal inspectors later found
his name on the mailing list for this bookstore. For the next
2 and 1/2 years, two government agencies (the Postal
Service and the Customs Service) made repeated efforts,
through five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen pal, to
ascertain Jacobson's willingness to break a new federal law
by ordering sexually explicit photographs of children through
the mail.
These agencies finally piqued Jacobson's interest, and
he ordered a magazine. When he received the magazine,
he was arrested and his house searched. The search dis( t ;losed only the two original magazines and the material
sent by the federal agencies. The Supreme Court ruled as
a matter of law that Jacobson had been entrapped.
Whether Jacobson expands the entrapment defense is
controversial. The dissent argued that the majority opinion

PRIVATE INDUCEMENTS
The defense of entrapment does not extend to inducements made by a private individual not working as or in conjunction with a government agent. See State v. Hsie, 36
Ohio App.3d 99, 103, 303 N.E.2d 89 (1973) ("At most, defendant claims he was motivated by the urgings of a mutual
friend but not by any inducement of the state's agent.");
United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir.
1994) ("There is no defense of private entrapment."); United
States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1983); Henderson
v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956) ("Well
settled ... it is that the doctrine of entrapment does not extend to acts of inducement on the part of a private citizen
who is not an officer of the law.").
Generally, the defense is available only when the inducement originated with law enforcement officers. E.g.,
Jacobson (Postal Service and Customs Service agents);
Russell (undercover agent for Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs); Sorrells (prohibition agent). This category extends to paid informants. E.g., Matthews (FBI informant); Hampton (DEA informant). As the Supreme Court
noted in Sherman, the "Government cannot make such use
of an informer and then claim disassociation through ignorance." 356 U.S. at 369. The Court also observed:
"Although he was not being paid, [the informer] was an active government informer who had but recently been the in-
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stigator of at least two other prosecutions." ld. at 373-74.
See also State v, Good, 11 0 Ohio ApJJ. 415, 439; 165
N.E.2d 28 (1960) (dissent) ("The State in this case cannot
claim disassociation from the work of its informer and agent,
it being quite clear that the informer ... was acting under the
instructions of the Police Department although its members
may not have known about every detail of his conduct toward the defendant.").

es on the government's conduct in inducing the defendant's
participation in the crime. "This test shifts attention from the
record and predisposition of the particular defendant to t~e
conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectiv~l~ considered, that it would entrap only those ready and Willing to
commit crime." Sherman, at 384 (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
Under this view, the issue is whether the police's conduct
would induce a reasonable (hypothetical) person to break
the law. Thus, the Model Penal Code frames the issue as
whether law enforcement officials employed "methods of
persuasion or inducement that create a substantial risk that
such an offense will be committed by persons other than
those who are ready to commit it." Model Penal Code
2.13(1 )(1Jf(1962).

DERIVATIVE ENTRAPMENT
The Seventh Circuit has recognized "derivative entrapment," which arises when a private person is entrapped and
then acts as an agent or conduit for police efforts to entrap
·
others. The court wrote:
[W]hile there is no defense of either private entrapment
or vicarious entrapment, there is a defense of derivative entrapment: when a private individual, himself entrapped, acts as agent or conduit for governmental efforts at entrapment, the government as principal is
bound. This principle follows as we said from the unquestioned principle that the entrapment defense will
lie whether the government uses its own employee as
the stinger or an informant. U.S. v. Hollingsworth, 27
F.3d 1196, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994).

Rationale
Under the objective approach, the underlying basis for
the entrapment defense is not the "innocence" of the accused but rather the prohibition of "unlawful governmental
activity in instigating crime." Russell, 411 U.S. at 442
(Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Sherman, 356 U.S. at
380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Public confidence in the
fair and honorable administration of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule of law, is the transcending value at
stake.").
Furthermore, this rationale requires the court, and not the
jury, to decide the issue: "[S]uch a judgment, aimed at
blocking off areas of impermissible police conduct, is appropriate for the court and not the jury." Sherman, 356 U.S. at
385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Sorrells, Justice
Roberts put it this way: "The protection of its own functions
and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs
only to the court. It is the province of the court and the court
alone to protect itself and the government from such prostitution of the criminal law." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457.
According to its proponents, the objective approach is superior to the subjective approach for several reasons. First,
the legislative intent rationale, the basis for the subjective
approach, is a "sheer fiction." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379.
"[T]he courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not
because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the
statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about
conviction cannot be countenanced." ld. at 380.
Second, the subjective test permits the introduction of
prejudicial evidence of bad character, which may force the
accused to abandon the defense. "The danger of prejudice
... is evident. The defendant must either forego the claim
of entrapment or run the risk that, in spite of instructions, the
jury will allow a criminal record or bad reputation to weigh in
its determination of guilt of the specific offense of which he
stands charged." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383. Or, if the defense is pursued, an otherwise innocent person may be
convicted. "The possibility that no matter what his past
crimes and general disposition the defendant might not
have committed the particular crime unless confronted with
inordinate inducements, must not be ignored." ld. at 383.
Third, the subjective test provides no guidance for the
police: "Equally important is the consideration that a jury
verdict, although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the
particular case, cannot give significant guidance for official
conduct for the future." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385. Because
the objective approach is designed to control police conduct, rather than determine the innocence of a particular defendant, it shares some of the attributes of the exclusionary

SERIOUS CRIME EXCEPTION
The entrapment defense may be unavailable in certain
types of prosecutions. In Sorrells the Supreme Court remarked: "We have no occasion to consider hypothetical
cases of crimes so heinous or revolting that the applicable
law would admit of no exceptions." 287 U.S. at 451. The
Model Penal Code, although adopting the objective approach, also recognized an exception; the defense is "unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based
on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person
other than the person perpetrating the entrapment." Model
Penal Code 2.13(3) (1962).
This exception is based on the notion that it "is unlikely
that a law abiding person could be persuaded by any tactics
to engage in [violent] behavior, and a person who can be
persuaded to cause such injury presents a danger that the
public cannot safely disregard." Model Penal Code and
Commentaries: Official Draft and Revised Comments pt. 1,
§ 2.13, at 420 (1985) ·(also noting the adoption of this exception in several state criminal codes).
OBJECTIVE TEST
The objective approach, advocated by Justice Roberts in
a separate opinion in Sorrells, and by Justice Frankfurter in
a concurring opinion in Sherman, is sometimes called the
"police conduct" test. This approach can be traced to
Justice Brandeis' celebrated dissent in Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928), in which he wrote: "This
prosecution should be stopped, not because some right of
[the accused's] has been denied, but in order to protect the
Government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers.
To preserve the purity of its courts." The majority of commentators favor the objective approach and the Model
Penal Code adopted it. Nevertheless, it remains a minority
position.
Police conduct
In contrast to the subjective approach, which focuses on
the accused's predisposition, the objective approach focus-
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rule in search and seizure and confession cases. 1 LaFave
& Scott, § 5.2(c), at 602 ("So viewed, the entrapment defense appears to be a procedural device (somewhat like the
Fourth Amendment and Miranda exclusionary rules) for de.:;::,+erring undesirable governmental intrusions into the lives of
/J;itizens.").

The Court reaffirmed Doran in State v. Italiano, 18 Ohio
St.3d 38, 42, 479 N.E.2d 857 (1985) ("It is not entrapment
... when it is shown that the accused was predisposed to
commit the offense, and the state merely provided the accused with the opportunity to commit the offense.") .
Some appellate cases appear to collapse the twopronged test into the predisposition issue. State v. SeebeckHorstman, 67 Ohio App.3d 443, 446, 587 N,E.2d 359
(1990) ("The ultimate issue is whether a preponderance of
evidence establishes that the accused lacked the predisposition to commit the offense with which he is charged.");
State v. Savage, 1 Ohio App.3d 13, 14,437 N.E.2d 1202
(1980) ("Absence of 'predisposition' on the part of the accused is the principal element of the entrapment defense.").
Defendants have prevailed in only a few of the reported
cases. E.g., State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio App.2d 212, 219, 396
N.E.2d 786 (1977) (court described the police's conduct as
"entrapment by duress or to coin a phrase, aggravated entrapment"); State v. Sarto, 36 Misc. 184,304 N.E.2d 919,
920 (CP 1973) ("[nhere is not the slightest suggestion that
this defendant had ever participated in dealing in marijuana,
except for his own use, either before or after this alleged offense.").

OHIO RULE
By the 1980s, several Ohio courts of appeal had adopted
the subjective approach. E.g., State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio
App.2d 212,396 N.E.2d 786 (1977); State v. Hsie, 36 Ohio
App.2d 99, 303 N.E.2d 89 (1973); State v. McDonald, 32
Ohio App.2d 231, 289 N.E.2d 583 (1972).
State v. Doran
The Ohio Supreme Court did not address the issue comprehensively until State v. Doran, 5 Ohio St.3d 187, 190,
449 N.E.2d 1295 (1983), where the Court noted that it had
"not yet defined which test is applicable in this state." Prior
cases had focused on other entrapment issues. See State
v. Minnker, 27 Ohio St.2d 155, 271 N.E.2d 821, 825 (1971)
(no error in failing to instruct on entrapment) ("[l]t is not entrapment for the officer to place himself in a position to apprehend those participating in the criminal conduct, and he
may use inducement and set traps to apprehend them.").
The Supreme Court explicitly embraced the subjective
approach: "The defense of entrapment is established
where the criminal design originates with the officials of the
government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order to prosecute." Doran, at 190.
.
In addition, the Court cited a number of the traditional ob~ )ections to the objective approach to support its decision.
·· First, an "innocenf' person could be convicted under the objective standard:
[T]he objective test focuses upon the nature and degree of the inducement by the government agent and
not upon the predisposition of the accused. Thus,
even though the accused may not be individually predisposed to commit the crime, the inducement may not
be the type to induce a reasonably law abiding citizen,
and thus lead to the conviction of an otherwise innocent citizen. ld. at 191.
Second, the objective test could also lead to the acquittal
of the guilty. By ignoring the predisposition of the individual
accused, "a 'career' criminal, or one who leaves little or no
doubt as to his predisposition to commit a crime, will avoid
conviction if the police conduct satisfies the objective test."
ld. at 191. See also Russell, 411 U.S. at 434 ("Nor does it
seem particularly desirable for the law to grant complete immunity from prosecution to one who himself planned to
commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because the
government undercover agents subjected him to inducements which might have seduced a hypothetical individual
who was not so predisposed.").
Third, the objective test could adversely effect the accuracy of the fact-finding process: "Since most of these inducements will be offered in secrecy, the trial will more than
·. likely be reduced to a swearing contest between an ac~ ~used claiming that improper inducements were used and a
police officer denying the accused's exhortations." Doran, at
191. In contrast, under the subjective test, ''the fact-finding
process is enhanced because evidence of predisposition
may come from objective sources." ld. at 192.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In contrast to the objective view, entrapment under the
subjective approach raises a jury issue. See Matthews, 485
U.S. at 63 ("The question of entrapment is generally one for
the jury, rather than for the court."); Masciale v. United
States, 356 U.S. 386, 829 (1958) ("While petitioner presented enough evidence for the jury to consider, they were entitled to disbelieve him in regard to [the informant] and so find
for the Government on the issue of guilt.").
Only in clear cases will the issue be decided by the court.
Sherman was one such case: "The case at bar illustrates
an evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to
overcome. The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning to the habit of use." 356 U.S.
at 376. Jacobson was another.
In Doran the Ohio Supreme Court held the jury instruction defective because it failed to correctly allocate the burden of persuasion. Doran, 5 Ohio St.3d at 191 ("A jury instruction which fails to allocate any burden of proof on the
affirmative defense of entrapment is inherently misleading
and confusing and is prejudicial error."). See also Ohio Jury
Instruction § 411.25.
An instruction is not required, however, if insufficient evidence of entrapment is in the record. See State v. Dotson,
35 Ohio App.3d 135, 139, 520 N.E.2d 240 (1987) Uury instruction not required where neither prosecution or defense
evidence raised entrapment; "There is nothing to indicate
that the agent did more than supply a possible market, and
that market was immediately developed by the defendant
into an actual sale."); State v. Birns, 10 Ohio App.2d 1 03,
226 N.E.2d 149 (1967) (instruction not required because
there was "no evidence to suggest even entrapmenf'), cert
denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968).
BURDEN OF PROOF
In other jurisdictions that adopt the subjective view, the
accused has the burden of establishing the fact of government inducement. 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.2(f)(e) (1986).
Once this threshold is satisfied, the burden shifts to the gov-
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evidence is found in Doran, where the Court expressed
concern about the"scope of admissible evidence on the
issue of an accused's predisposition." The Court wrote:
While evidence relevant to predisposition should be
freely admitted, judges should be hesitant to allow evi(
dence of the accused's bad reputation, without more,
on the issue of predisposition. Rather, while by no
means an exhaustive list, the following matters would
certainly be relevant on the issue of predisposition: (1)
the accused's previous involvement in criminal activity
of the nature charged, (2) the accused's ready acquiescence to the inducements offered by the police; (3)
the accused's expert knowledge in the area of the
criminal activity charged; (4) the accused's ready access to contraband; and (5) the accused's willingness
to involve himself in the criminal activity. ld. at 191-92.
Other relevant factors include an accused's own admissions
of past deeds or future plans and the results of a search
that shows the defendant is involved in a "course of ongoing
criminal activity." 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2(f) (1), at 607.
Numerous Ohio cases address this evidence issue. E.g.,
State v. Smith, 92 Ohio App.3d 172, 176-78, 634 N.E.2d
659 (1993) (applying the Doran factors); State v. Cheraso,
43 Ohio App.3d 221, 222, 540 N.E.2d 326 (1988) ("Once
[entrapment] is established, the state can rebut the entrapment defense by showing that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime."); Columbus v. Corne, 7 Ohio
App.3d 344, 345-46, 455 N.E.2d 696 (1982) ("But, after the
prosecution has rested 1its case and the defense of entrapment is raised and pursued by the accused, then, the prosecution may introduce rebuttal evidence in an effort to show
the accused's predisposition to commit the crime.") ; State v.
Savage, 1 Ohio App.3d 13, 14, 437 N.E.2d 1202 (1980) (In \_
an entrapment case, ''the defendant waives his right to prohibit the state from showing his 'predisposition' and makes
predisposition relevant for the state to show on rebuttal.").

ernment to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable
doubt. In Jaeobsonthe UcS. Supreme Court commented:
'Where the Government has induced an individual to break
the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, ... the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to
first being approached by Government agents." Jacobson,
503 U.S. at 548-49.

Ohio rule
In Ohio, however, the burden of persuasion (by a preponderance of the evidence) for all affirmative defenses is allocated to the defendant by RC 2901.05(C)(2). The statute
defines an affirmative defense as one "involving an excuse
or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, on which he can fairly be required to adduce suppo-rting evidence." In Doran, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled
that entrapment was an affirmative defense within the
meaning of this statute. First, the Court noted that entrapment is a "classic confession and avoidance" and thus an
excuse or justification defense. 5 Ohio St.3d at 193.
Second, proof of entrapment is peculiarly within the accused's knowledge: "The key consideration with the subjective test is whether the accused was predisposed to commit
the offense. While proof of predisposition may come from
objective sources, only the accused possesses the actual
knowledge concerning his predisposition to commit the offense." ld.
Finally, it is not unfair to allocate the burden of persuasion to the accused.
The accused, as a participant in the commission of the
crime, will be aware of the circumstances surrounding
the crime, and is at no disadvantage in relaying to the
fact-finder: his version of the crime as well as the reason he was not predisposed to commit the crime.
Moreover, the accused will certainly be aware of his
previous involvement in crimes of a similar nature
which may tend to refute the accused's claim that he
was not predisposed to commit the offense. ld.
See also State v. Cheraso, 43 Ohio App.3d 221, 222, 540
N.E.2d 326 (1988) ("Entrapment is an affirmative defense
and appellant has the burden of establishing this defense by
a preponderance of evidence.").

Expert Testimony
Several federal courts have ruled that the defendant may
introduce expert testimony concerning his susceptibility to
inducement. See U.S. v. Mclernon, 7 46 F.2d 1098, 115
(6th Cir. 1984) ("expert testimony concerning a defendant's
predisposition may be invaluable in an entrapment case.");
U.S. v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Benveniste,
564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977); Graham, Handbook of
Federal Evidence§ 702.4, at 631 n.8 (3d ed. 1991 ). A few
Ohio cases have addressed this issue:
[The] defendant shall be permitted to introduce expert
psychiatric testimony as to any susceptibility to influence or suggestion as relevant to the predisposition
issue . . . . The expert shall not however testify as to
the actions of government agents or their effect upon
the defendant's susceptibility nor as to the ultimate
issue of the existence of entrapment which is within
the province of the jury. State v. Woods, 20 Misc.2d 1,
3, 484 N.E.2d 773 (CP 1984).
See also State v. Dapice, 57 Ohio App.3d 99, 105, 566
N.E.2d 1261 (1989) ("There is some authority that expert
testimony on the issue of predisposition may be admitted.
However, admission of such testimony is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial court.").

EVIDENCE ISSUES
Character evidence
As a general rule, character (propensity) evidence is inadmissible under Evid. H. 404(A). An entrapment defense,
however, necessarily raises issues concerning the defendant's character and commission of "other acts." See 1
Giannelli & Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.1 (3d ed 1996).
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Sorrells, "if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his
own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.
If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has
brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the
defense." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52.
Nevertheless, this evidence rule has been characterized
as the "greatest faulf' of the subjective approach and an "indiscriminate attitude toward predisposition evidence is by no
means a necessary feature of the subjective test." Park,
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163, 272
(1976). A similar caution about the admission of character

INCONSISTENT DEFENSES
"The traditional view has been that the defense of entrapment is not available to one who denies commission of the
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ion in Matthews, Justice Scalia wrote that "the defense of
entrapment will rarely be genuinely inconsistent with the defense on the merits, and when genuine inconsistency exists
its effect in destroying the defendant's credibility will suffice
to protect the interests of justice." 485 U.S. at 67 .

criminal act with which he is charged, for the reason that the
denial is inconsistent with the assertion of such a defense."
1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2(f)(3), at 609.
However, in Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S: 58
(~'1988), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "even if the de.endant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment." Matthews, an employee of the Small Business
Administration, was charged with accepting a bribe. The
trial court refused to instruct on entrapment, as requested
by Matthews, because Matthews would not admit committing all the elements of the crime, in particular the mens rea
element. (Matthews claimed the money was a personal loan
unrelated to S.B.A. business).
The Supreme Court held that denying the charge and asserting the affirmative defense of entrapment is permissible.
The prosecution argued that entrapment presupposed the
commission of the crime and a jury could not logically conclude that Matthews had !;loth failed to commit the crime
and been entrapped. The Court, however, saw nothing unusual about pleading inconsistent defenses. In an earlier
case, Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896), the
Court had held that a murder defendant was entitled to both
a manslaughter and self-defense instruction: "The affirmative defense of self-defense is, of course, inconsistent with
the claim that the defendant killed in the heat of passion."
Matthews, 485 U.S. at 64.
In Doran the Ohio Supreme Court appears to have taken
a different approach, noting that "[w]hen an accused raises
the defense of entrapment, the commission of the offense is
(Jf'dmitted" and "entrapment is the classic confession and
.- - avoidance." Doran, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 193. Numerous Ohio
cases follow this view. E.g., State v. Dapice, 57 Ohio App.3d
99, 105, 566 N.E.2d 1261 (1989) ("In the use of entrapment
as an affirmative defense, the defendant admits that he
committed the offense, but challenges the origin of the intent."); State v. Johnson, 4 Ohio App.3d 308, 310, 448
N.E.2d 520 (1982) ("Entrapment is a 'confession and avoidance' defense in which the defendant admits committing the
acts charged"); State v. Savage, 1 Ohio App.3d 13, 14, 437
N.E.2d 1202 (1980) ("Where a defendant, after the state
has rested its case in chief, affirmatively pursues the defense of entrapment he concedes that he committed the
crime and puts in issue whether he had a predisposition to
commit the crime."); State v. Hsie, 36 Ohio App.2d 99, 303
N.E.2d 89 (1973) ("The defense of entrapment is in the nature of a confession and avoidance and it assumes that he
act charged as a public offense was committed."); State v.
Good, 110 Ohio App.2d 415, 430, 165 N.E.2d 28, 28 (1960)
(Entrapment not available "when he denies that he committed such acts. Such claims ... are inconsistent with the
claim that he neither had for sale nor sold narcotics and
where his theory of the case is that he is innocent.").
Doran, however, was decided before Matthews, and it is
unclear whether the Doran dictum will be upheld when th·e
Ohio Supreme Court directly considers the issue.
Nevertheless, the Doran approach raises "serious constitu' _+ional questions concerning whether a defendant may be re\ 0 1uired, in effect, to surrender his presumption of innocence
and his privilege against self-incrimination in order to plead
entrapment." 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2(f)(3), at 609 (1986).
Furthermore, permitting "inconsistent" defenses does not
put the prosecution at a disadvantage. In a concurring opin-

GUILTY PlEAS
A guilty plea waives the right to appeal the issue of entrapment. E.g., United States v. Nunez, 958 F.2d 196, 200
(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sarmiento, 786 F.2d 665,
668 (5th Cir. 1986).

INFORMANT'S IDENTITY
The identity of an informant is subject to a limited privilege. If the defendant makes a showing that the identity of
the informant is necessarf to the defense, the privilege may
be breached. E.g., State v. Butler, 9 Ohio St.3d 156, 459
N.E.2d 536 (1984) (showing not made); State v. Williams, 4
Ohio St.3d 74, 446 N.E.2d 779 (1983). See also 1 Giannelli
& Snyder, Ohio Evidence§ 5.1 (3d ed 1996).
DUE PROCESS
In addition to the entrapment defense, which is a substantive criminal law issue, the due process clause has
been cited as the source of a constitutional "entrapment''
defense involving "outrageous police conduct." In United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,430 (1973), the defendant
asked the Court to recast the entrapment defense, arguing
that the defense should rest on due process grounds:
"[Russell's] principal contention is that the defense should
rest on constitutional grounds. He argues that the level of
Shapiro's involvement ... was so high that a criminal prosecution for the drug's manufacture violated the fundamental
principles of due process." Russell argued that this defense
should apply when "the criminal conduct would not have
been possible had not an undercover agent 'supplied an indispensable means to the commission of the crime that
could not have been obtained otherwise, through legal or illegal channels."' ld. at 431. The undercover agent supplied
propanone, a necessary ingredient in the illicit manufacture
of methamphetamine ("speed"). The chemical, however, is
harmless and its possession was not illegal. In addition, the
drug was available from other sources.
The Court rejected Russell's argument but left open the
possibility of a due process defense in a later case: "While
we may some day be presented with a situation in which
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction, ..
. the instant case is distinctly not of that breed." ld. at 431_32 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), holding
that stomach pumping a suspect to obtain drugs "shocks
the conscience" and thus violates due process).
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, the author of the above
passage, divorced himself from his dictum in Hampton v.
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976), arguing in his plurality opinion that a defendant has only the substantive criminal law entrapment defense: "If the police engage in illegal
activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of
their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, along with
Justice Blackmun, wrote that he was "unwilling to join the
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plurality in concluding that, no matter what the circumstances, neither dUe process prinCiples nor ot.n· sLIJ5e-rJisory
power could support a bar to conviction in any case where
the Government is able to prove predisposition." ld. at 495.
Justice Brennan, joined by Stewart and Marshall, dissented
but agreed with the Powell opinion on the due process
issue. ld. at 497 ("I agree with Mr. Justice Powell that
Russell does not foreclose imposition of a bar to conviction
- based upon our supervisory power or due process principles -where the conduct of law enforcement authorities is
sufficiently offensive, even though the individuals entitled to
invoke such a defense might be 'predisposed."').
The federal appellate courts are divided on whether a
due process defense even exists. In United States v. ··
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit became one of the few courts to bar prosecution on due process grounds. lf1 that case the informant suggested the establishment of a drug manQfacturing operation, located a
site for the operation, supplied the equipment and materials,
and ran the lab. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit ruled in United
States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1428 (6th Cir. 1994), that
there was ·no due process defense. "[W]e hold that a defendant whose defense sounds in inducement is, by congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent, limited to the
defense of entrapment and its key element of predisposition. Defendants may not circumvent this restriction by
couching their defense in terms of 'due process' or 'supervisory powers."'
In Doran the Ohio Supreme Court commented on this
issue: "An accused may put the conduct of the police or
their agent into issue by arguing that such conduct was so
outrageous as to violate due process. . . . In our view, a
'due process' defense is analytically distinct from the defense of entrapment." 5 Ohio St.3d at 192 n. 4 (citing
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). Some appellate
cases, however, have "refused to recognize the due process defense of outrageous government conduct separate
from the entrapment defense." State v. Jurek, 52 Ohio

App.3d 30, 33, 556 N.E.2d 1191 (1 989), motion granted, 46
Ohio St.3d 704, 545 N.E.2d 1282 (1989), dismissed, 47
Ohio St.3d 711, 548 N.E.2d 241 (1989). See also State v.
Latina, 13 Ohio App.3d 182, 185, 468 N.E.2d 1139 (1 984)
("The Ohio courts have not recognized a due process de- 1
tense of outrageous government conduct separate from the!(
entrapment defense.").
Another court has disagreed. State v. Miller, 11 93 WL
294806 (App) ("[W]e hold again as we have held before,
that a due process defense outside the defense of entrapment may be made in Ohio."). In State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio
App.2d 212, 219,396 N.E.2d 786 (1977), the court described the police conduct as "entrapment by duress or to
coin a phrase, aggravated entrapment." The court entered
a judgment of acquittal, commenting that under these circumstances the subjective test is "unwaiianted." ld. at 219.
This case comes very close to a due process analysis. The
court added: "Whenever the government undertakes to entrap by duress such conduct must fail as a matter of sound
public policy. Duress by law enforcement personnel is as
hostile to the preservation of liberty as is the use by the government of force to extract a confession of crime from an innocent person." ld.
If the police induce violence or threats of violence against
innocent parties, use contingent fee arrangements with informants, initiate sexual relations to induce the crime, or
offer exorbitant financial rewards, a due process defense
may be successful. 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.2(g); Whitebread
& Slobogin, Criminal Procedure ch. 19 (3d ed. 1993).

REFERENCES
1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 5.2 (1 986).
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses§ 209 (1 984).
Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (1989).
Barker, Entrapment in Ohio, 17 Akron L. Rev. 709 (1984).

8

